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Since the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, an awkward nexus 
of security and economics has been the primary driver of North American governance. 
This nexus emerged as a pragmatic response to the poisonous politics of economic 
integration that ensued after 1994 and the advent of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). In 2005, the three NAFTA countries launched the Security and 
Prosperity Partnership (SPP), aimed at reinvigorating the North American agenda to 
reflect the realities of security and economics. Unfortunately, the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security has become the main focal point for policies affecting America’s 
borders as the department’s mandate has overwhelmed economic considerations and 
the policy approach has converged around security and law enforcement. Prospects for 
a new integration project will remain dim for the foreseeable future. However, the 
paralysis generated by the security-economics nexus has created new governance space 
in North America that complements the broad evolution of federal politics in all three 
NAFTA countries, particularly where proposals for reform of the Department of 
Homeland Security are concerned. 
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Introduction 
  major consequence of President Nixon’s opening of U.S. relations with the 
People’s Republic of China in the early 1970s was the shift in U.S. diplomatic 
relations away from Taipei and the Republic of China to Beijing and the People’s 
Republic of China in 1979. Sensing that Beijing might seize the opportunity to 
pressure Taipei for reunification, Taiwanese president Chiang Ching-Kuo sought to 
reaffirm Taiwan’s independence from Beijing with a strict policy of “three noes”; no 
contact, no compromise, and no negotiation. While not entirely responsible for 
entrenching the status quo across Taiwan Strait, the “three noes” had a chilling effect 
on prospects for closer ties between Taipei and Beijing that largely holds to this day. 
North America represents a far different geopolitical space, but a similar set of 
“three noes” has been having a similarly chilling effect on closer ties among the “three 
amigos” for much of the past two decades. The late 1980s and early 1990s were a 
period of rapid change in North American economic relations. Two major trade 
agreements, the Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) in 1989 and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, seemed to herald a new period of 
economic and political integration in a direction similar to that which had evolved in 
Europe during the postwar period. However, shortly after the NAFTA was concluded, 
“three noes” – no money, no disputes, and no legislation – effectively ended progress 
on issues left over from the NAFTA debate and stifled initiatives to build upon what 
the NAFTA had begun.  
Part of the argument of this article is that the “three noes” are, in part, a pragmatic 
response to the poisonous trade politics that emerged out of the NAFTA debate in 
1994. And while the U.S. trade agenda has experienced periods of activity, most 
notably under the administration of George W. Bush, the North American agenda has 
consistently suffered from the restrictions imposed by the “three noes.” The 
completion of Barack Obama’s first year in office is an obvious time to assess aspects 
of the North American agenda, especially North America’s borders; such an 
assessment is the focus of this article. 
Since the conclusion of the NAFTA in 1994, policy makers, academics, and policy 
wonks of all stripes have been engaged in the search for “next steps” in North 
American governance. That search is littered with the policy recommendation 
wreckage of numerous blue ribbon panels, “eminent persons groups,” and government 
reports, all of which have recommended picking up where the NAFTA left off and 
moving towards deeper stages of economic integration and political coordination in 
North America.
1 Throughout the 1990s, initiatives were launched, shelved, and 
sometimes launched again in an effort to deal with the NAFTA’s perceived 
A Greg Anderson 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy                  282 
 
shortcomings; nearly all of these initiatives came to naught, in part because of the 
“three noes.” 
Not until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States did any 
of this activity generate movement toward more coordinated North American 
governance, nearly all of which was devoted to mitigating the negative trade effects of 
enhanced security. In the process, economic policy was wedded to security in North 
America but remained subject to, and ultimately limited by, the “three noes.” The 
2005 Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) was designed to manage the new 
nexus but was, in effect, an imperfect byproduct of the many previously unsuccessful 
initiatives to deal with the lingering imperfections of the NAFTA. 
One of the main challenges confronting North America in the management of 
borders actually concerns the SPP and its U.S. implementation by the Department of 
Homeland Security (the security agenda) and the Department of Commerce (the 
prosperity agenda). Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 
2003, management of policies concerning America’s two borders has converged 
around security and law enforcement. Moreover, ineffectual mechanisms for border 
management, such as the SPP, have actually served to bury large parts of the North 
American agenda within each country’s bureaucracies, making them more difficult to 
deal with. All of this has stimulated new rounds of initiatives and policy proposals 
designed to garner the attention of new leadership in Washington and Ottawa, as well 
as the Calderon government in Mexico City. Proposals and approaches have ranged 
from sweeping new integration projects, such as a customs union
2 or the creation of a 
binding joint commission to manage border issues,
3 to the devolution of responsibility 
for border management to local and regional interests such as states and provinces or 
public-private partnerships.
4 
This article will make two claims about the governance of borders and economic 
policy in North America during the remainder of the Obama presidency. Firstly, and 
perhaps obviously to students of North American integration, the nexus of security 
and economics as shaped by the “three noes” will continue to hinder already murky 
prospects for new governance initiatives that could substantially alter dynamics 
entrenching themselves around North America’s borders. Secondly, and perhaps 
giving more cause for optimism, the additional paralysis generated by the security-
economics nexus has created new governance space in North America that 
complements the broad evolution of federal politics in all three NAFTA countries. In 
short, the status quo paralysis on the North American agenda as driven by Ottawa, 
Washington, and Mexico City will continue; however, momentum toward greater 
shared governance and development of practical solutions to pressing problems will Greg Anderson 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy                  283 
 
increasingly be driven more by local and regional actors than by North America’s 
national capitals. 
In support of these two claims, I point to five broad streams of evidence that form 
the structure of this article. First, in the presence of a large U.S. agenda, North 
American issues have largely been delegated to the departments of Commerce (DOC) 
and Homeland Security (DHS). Second, recent and on the whole discouraging trends 
in U.S. trade policy–making are reflective of the absence of political support for a new 
liberalization project. Third, the absence of leadership from Ottawa and the presence 
of voices pushing to re-bilateralize North America further hinder already murky 
prospects for progress. Fourth, the U.S. immigration reform debate and prospects for 
enhanced labour mobility present complicated issues that affect the whole of North 
America. Fifth, and providing more cause for optimism, a strategy of regionalization 
in dealing with the North American agenda that leverages each country’s shared 
experience with federalism represents a constructive path forward for overcoming the 
tyranny of the “three noes.” 
 
Large U.S. Agenda 
A major problem confronting North American leadership is the lack of high-level 
profile for shared problems. Except for periods in which there have been serious 
bilateral conflicts or common problems needing resolution (acid rain, drug violence, 
or illegal immigration), Ottawa and Mexico City have often found it difficult to get on 
the American agenda. Since September 11, 2001, this has only become more difficult. 
Only those matters needing immediate attention, such as border security, have been 
placed at the top of the U.S. agenda. The United States always has a full agenda, but 
with two wars and a financial crisis to dig itself out of, that agenda is especially full. 
All of this leaves limited space for North America, and the Obama Administration’s 
focus on these issues and on healthcare reform in the second half of 2009 has 
consumed most of the available policy oxygen in Washington. Hence, North America 
will continue being a tough sell. 
In the past eight years, North America has actually ranked high on the U.S. 
agenda. The “shotgun marriage” of economics and security brought on by September 
11 generated a rapid response in the form of the Smart Border Accords in late 2001 
(Canada–U.S.)
5 and early 2002 (U.S.–Mexico).
6 The accords were byproducts of 
older, unfinished initiatives from the 1990s, each of which was hobbled by the “three 
noes.” The tyranny of the “three noes” in turn formed an underlying set of strictures 
on the 2005 Security and Prosperity Partnership into which the Smart Border Accords Greg Anderson 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy                  284 
 
were folded.
7 The SPP was designed to help manage a large number of agenda items, 
many of which were highly technocratic in nature. It was also a pragmatic response to 
the imperatives of the “three noes.” By limiting SPP work to low-hanging, mildly 
controversial work, such as changes to NAFTA rules of origin, the SPP required no 
new funding, would generate no new trilateral disputes, and did not require new 
legislative grants of authority. As a result, tangible deliverables from the SPP have 
been few and far between. Apart from institutionalizing annual leaders’ summits, the 
SPP has essentially buried North American issues within each country’s bureaucratic 
apparatus. Moreover, we have now created a kind of “alphabet soup” of programs for 
preferred travelers, advance cargo screening, and reporting.
8 Each of these new 
programs is intended to mitigate the economic effects of enhanced security measures. 
Yet, with each new layer of security, each new measure to smooth its effects, many 
worry that we are adding to the “thickening” of North America’s borders. The direct 
evidence of “thickening” uncovered by researchers has thus far been mixed, but 
growing,
9 with a potential impact much greater than waiting times at border crossings. 
 
DHS: Getting there … sort of … 
This thickening is especially problematic in the United States, where the Department 
of Homeland Security has been charged with management of the security agenda. The 
growing pains of DHS since its creation in 2003 are well known.
10 Recent assessments 
of DHS have offered higher marks for the agency, but with much work to be done in 
areas of risk management and consolidated Congressional oversight.
11 In 2007, for 
example, DHS officials appeared more than 200 times before 86 committees and 
subcommittees, attended 2,242 briefings for Members of Congress, wrote 460 
mandated reports, and answered thousands of queries from individual members.
12,13 
As importantly, the reorganization of the American bureaucracy, driven as it is by 
security, has transformed the management of America’s borders into a matter of law 
enforcement. The security agenda has increasingly overshadowed the prosperity 
agenda as managed by the Department of Commerce. As such, the Department of 
Homeland Security has increasingly become the frontline agency handling most 
Mexican and Canadian affairs. 
Although the NAFTA famously contained “too few institutions”
14 of a 
supranational variety (none in fact) it did institutionalize many aspects of North 
American relations by depoliticizing them in legalistic dispute settlement mechanisms 
and clarifying lines of responsibility within each bureaucracy. In other words, the 
NAFTA actually made it more difficult to get most Mexican and Canadian issues on 
the White House agenda. The litany of the post-9/11 alphabet soup, reaffirmed and Greg Anderson 
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entrenched by events and processes culminating in the SPP, only exacerbated this by 
creating little or no political momentum, incorporating little new legislative oversight, 
and by pushing North America deeper into a bureaucracy dominated by the law 
enforcement culture of DHS.
15 
The Obama Administration has distanced itself from the SPP label by focusing on 
the North American Leaders Summit (NALS), but the SPP agenda within remains, and 
has merit.
16 In addition to institutionalizing the annual summits (NALS), the SPP 
agenda usefully placed responsibility for resolving the “tyranny of small differences” 
that complicate North American integration in the hands of technocratic experts, 
thereby shielding difficult work from the complications of politics. 
However, in turning much of the management of the border over to DHS, the SPP 
has not served the North American agenda well precisely because border management 
has been depoliticized. North America has been transformed into a series of law 
enforcement measures driven by the U.S. Congress or by the rule-making capacity of 
DHS. The Department of Homeland Security increasingly applies symmetrical 
approaches to both the U.S.–Mexican and Canada–U.S. borders. The application of 
uniform policy applied to very different borders, coupled with the burying of the 
North American agenda in a technocratic and law enforcement mentality, undermines 
the ability to push North America up the U.S. list of priorities. 
The early and near-unanimous confirmation of Arizona Governor Janet 
Napolitano to be Secretary of Homeland Security was a potentially a welcome shift. 
Unlike Secretary Chertoff, whose background moved DHS more firmly toward being 
a law enforcement body, Governor Napolitano appears positioned to better appreciate 
and balance the complicated politics of the many issues on the North American 
agenda DHS will continue to deal with. Like Secretary Chertoff, Secretary Napolitano 
also has a federal law enforcement background (former U.S. Attorney) and a 
reputation as governor for being tough on security issues. In fact, she stunned fellow 
Democrats by declaring a state of emergency with respect to illegal immigration so 
that more resources could be directed at the U.S.–Mexican border to help stem the 
tide.
17 However, Secretary Napolitano has also been sharply critical of federal inaction 
with respect to border issues, especially funding to the states, and has been a long-
time supporter of U.S. immigration reform as a means of dealing with illegal 
crossings.
18 
In her confirmation hearings, Secretary Napolitano acknowledged that her 
understanding of the northern border was limited, but implicitly seemed to understand 
fundamental differences between it and the southern border.
19 However, following 
confirmation, Secretary Napolitano’s first act was to order a review of the northern Greg Anderson 
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border, sending a chill through those who hoped for increased differentiation between 
it and the southern border.
20 Both the review and Secretary Napolitano’s subsequent 
statements during the course of the past year have dashed those hopes, reaffirmed the 
symmetrical approach DHS is taking with both borders, and re-kindled worries over 
“thickening” by identifying the need for additional security measures along the 
northern border.
21 At a March 2009 borders conference hosted by the Brookings 
Institution in Washington, D.C., Napolitano was explicit: 
One of the things that we need to be sensitive to is the very real feelings 
among southern border states and in Mexico that if things are being done 
on the Mexican border, they should also be done on the Canadian border… 
we shouldn’t go light on one and heavy on the other.
 22 
The balance between law enforcement and political pragmatism Secretary Napolitano 
is able to entrench in the culture of DHS may determine the parameters of progress on 
the North American agenda. Unless, and until, Secretary Napolitano can instill the 
kind of pragmatism in DHS that seems to be characteristic of the President himself, it 
will remain very difficult for Canada and Mexico to pull border issues out of DHS and 
onto the White House agenda where many of them need to be if action is to be taken. 
 
U.S. Trade Policy 
Recent scholarship on U.S. trade policy has offered countless insights and analyses 
that are beyond the scope of this article.
23 However, the contemporary nexus of 
security and economics in North America necessitates addressing this nexus as set 
against trade policy. Moreover, in spite of the marginalization of the NAFTA itself in 
the context of the SPP or NALS,
24 the U.S. trade agenda is synonymous with North 
American integration. Moreover, any action on security that affects North American 
integration will necessarily involve trade and finance.Thus, while the process of 
liberalization appears to have stalled over the 1994-2009 period since the completion 
of the Uruguay Round, in fact a great deal of liberalization has been taking place. 
More than 75 countries, including China, have joined the WTO over the period. Each 
has liberalized its trade regime to some extent as a result of the accession negotiations. 
The cumulative liberalization is extensive. 
The U.S. trade policy agenda is wrecked. Eight years of Bush Administration 
activism on international trade issues have given way to populist acrimony over the 
direction and posture of U.S. leadership on trade liberalization.
25 After a first term in 
office that included the launch of the Doha Round of the WTO, successfully reviving 
fast-track negotiating authority, and the launch of a slew of bilateral and regional trade Greg Anderson 
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initiatives, the Bush Administration lost nearly all of that momentum, and few public 
officials are willing to defend trade liberalization.
26 The Doha Round has descended 
into stalemate over rich-country agricultural subsidies, several bilateral trade 
agreements have stalled (Peru, Colombia, South Korea), and fast-track negotiating 
authority has been allowed to expire. 
The broad malaise that has seized the American trade agenda is arguably part of 
the ebb and flow of the politics of protectionism that often coincides with 
deteriorating economic conditions (i.e., “buy America” provisions of the Obama 
stimulus). However, the expiration of fast track portends a difficult period for U.S. 
leadership in the international economy because the demise of fast track has involved 
more than the lapse of timetables. On April 10, 2008, the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, and the House Democratic leadership approved a 
change to House rules governing the legislative time-table by which trade agreements 
negotiated by the president had to be brought to a vote. The trade agreement in 
question was the U.S.–Colombia Free Trade Agreement, completed in November 
2006, and now effectively in legislative limbo because of the rule change. 
For most of the postwar period, Congress has delegated its constitutional authority 
to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations…” to the president. Since 1974 and the 
creation of so-called fast-track authority, that basic delegation has involved increased 
consultation between the White House and Congress, a 90-day legislative time table to 
bring agreements to a vote, and a congressional promise that deals will not be 
amended. The U.S. commitment to foreign nations that agreements will not be 
amended is effectively dead. 
While fast track is not an absolute necessity for tackling the North American 
agenda, its demise is a significant sign of the lack of enthusiasm for a new integration 
project on the scale of a customs union, which would certainly require a fast-track 
mechanism of some kind. Hence, the no-new-legislation element of the “three noes” 
takes on even greater salience since a major new North American integration project 
would likely entail the political battle for a fast-track replacement as well as any 
agreement itself. More narrowly, concerns among North American business leaders 
about the “thickening” of borders due to a range of security measures and the need to 
deal with a range of non-tariff barriers will undoubtedly require new legislation.
27 In 
the presence of a trade agenda in desperate need of repair, and given the bitterness and 
populism concerning trade policy exhibited during the U.S. presidential campaign, it 
is hard to foresee significant momentum being generated in favour of a new 
integration project. Greg Anderson 
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A related problem concerns the role of the Department of Commerce in managing 
the prosperity agenda of the SPP. Like DHS, the Department of Commerce is a 
leviathan agency whose economic divisions are engaged in export promotion for 
American business. Unfortunately, it is also the main U.S. agency responsible for 
defending American business from foreign competition. It is the responsibility of the 
International Trade Administration, and the Import Administration in particular, to 
implement U.S. trade remedy laws; in other words, the Department of Commerce is 
defensive and inward looking. While DOC is part of the inter-agency team working on 
new liberalization initiatives, the more outward looking United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) leads these initiatives. Notably, USTR has not been an 
important part of the SPP even though the left-over NAFTA agenda forms the core of 
the prosperity agenda of the SPP. 
 
Absence of Leadership from Ottawa, and the Voices of 
“Re-bilateralization” 
Ottawa’s leadership on North America has been suspect for many years, and 
contemporary voices calling for a “re-bilateralization” of North America are 
complicating matters further. 
The federal budget cuts of the early 1990s severely curtailed Canada’s policy 
capacity in international affairs, and with respect to the United States in particular. A 
string of diplomatic miscues in the 1990s and an inability to interpret shifts in the 
American polity left Ottawa scrambling for solutions after 9/11 brought about 
significant changes to the U.S. security posture. While dusting off the Smart Border 
process of the late 1990s and pushing for its implementation as the Smart Border 
Accords of 2001 and 2002 was constructive, these were also inherently defensive 
measures, designed to mitigate the economic effects of American security imperatives. 
Since then, Canada has also pursued a defensive posture with respect to the 
implementation of U.S. legislation dealing with cargo reporting (2002 Bioterorism 
Act), immigration (US-VISIT, WHTI), security at borders (“thickening”), the “buy 
America” provisions of the U.S. stimulus bill, as well as provisions of U.S. climate 
change legislation. 
Whereas a consistent vision of North America, and Mexico’s place in it, has 
emanated from Mexico City since President Carlos Salinas de Gortari proposed free 
trade with George H.W. Bush in 1990, the same cannot be said for Ottawa. Salinas’ 
bold proposal was met in Ottawa with a defensive request to join the discussions, 
mainly to preserve hard-won access to the American market negotiated under the 
Canada–U.S. agreement just two years earlier. Since then, Ottawa has largely been Greg Anderson 
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preoccupied with defending existing preferences without articulating what a North 
American community should look like. For a country so heavily dependent on open 
markets for its standard of living (roughly 40 percent of GDP is derived from exports, 
and more than 80 percent of those are destined for the United States), Ottawa has been 
as complicit as any party in failing to articulate or lead a push for a comprehensive 
approach to North America. Getting Canadian issues put high on the American agenda 
is going to continue to be difficult. 
Although Ottawa has yet to realize it, the road to a higher place on the U.S. 
agenda runs through Mexico City. 
Had Ottawa been able to articulate a bold North American agenda with the United 
States, it may not have been enough to overcome the “three noes.” However, Ottawa’s 
frustration with the lack of progress on the twin SPP agendas is, in part, the product of 
its own inability to articulate a North American vision beyond its relationship with 
Washington. That frustration has led to heightened discussion in Ottawa and 
elsewhere of re-bilateralizing the entire North American agenda.
28 From Ottawa’s 
perspective, re-bilateralization makes considerable sense. There appear to be many 
North American agenda items that could be more rapidly and comprehensively dealt 
with in a Canada–U.S. context. The argument is that North America’s two borders are 
quite different, and Canada’s relationship with Washington is very different from 
Washington’s with Mexico City. Trilateralizing such disparate sets of needs 
unnecessarily complicates and limits what can be accomplished. 
Yet, talk of re-bilateralization of North America is virtually a non-starter where 
the United States is concerned, a stance partly reflected in Secretary Napolitano’s 
March 2009 comments noted above. The NAFTA, and now the SPP process, have 
entrenched U.S. policy making, especially where borders are concerned, in a trilateral 
framework that will be difficult to undo. Desk officers at the Department of State and 
DHS will still be dedicated to bilateral issues; however, Washington invested heavily 
in political and economic reform in Mexico City when it supported the NAFTA, and a 
new administration is not going to allow this investment to be eroded through re-
bilateralization. North America has been characterized anecdotally as the sum of two 
bilateral relationships rather than a truly trilateral one. Yet such characterizations 
understate the degree to which the American bureaucratic and policy mind-set has 
shifted toward trilateral thinking in the aftermath of the NAFTA. 
Moreover, the pendulum of political power in the United States has swung 
decisively toward the desert southwest, a swing brought about in part by migration 
(internal and external) and the omnipresence of Latin America. Latino-Americans now 
comprise the largest minority group in the United States. They are a growing, Greg Anderson 
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increasingly well-organized, yet highly diverse subset of the American electorate. 
Both political parties have set their sights on winning their support, and U.S. relations 
with Latin American countries, Mexico most important among them, are high on their 
agendas. Yet it is not just the desert southwest where Latin America and American 
politics combine. Canada would do well to gain a greater appreciation of how 
powerfully Latin America looms throughout the United States, in its politics, culture, 
and policies. To put it bluntly, Canadians’ appreciation for Mexico does not extend 
much further than the beaches of Cancun or Puerto Vallarta. 
While there are obvious differences between Canada and Mexico, trilateral forums 
have become accepted mechanisms in Washington for dealing with its NAFTA 
partners. There are undoubtedly policy areas in which Ottawa and Washington could 
move with greater speed than can be attained trilaterally. But as Robert Pastor has 
argued, re-bilateralization would merely reinforce the huge asymmetries of power 
among the three countries – something Ottawa cannot possibly want.
29 In addition, the 
pull of Latin America in Washington is far too strong to allow even unofficial re-
bilateralization to marginalize Mexico City given the joint challenges along the U.S.–
Mexican border. To Canadians, the Merida Initiative, designed to combat the drug-
fueled violence all along the U.S.–Mexican border, is none of Ottawa’s business.
30 
However, the challenges of development and drug violence are not simply bilateral; 
they concern Canada as well because they seriously complicate Washington’s ability 
to move trilaterally on border security and immigration reform. 
Hence, expect U.S. border policy (immigration and security) to continue 
converging on both borders. 
 
Labour Mobility  
Many Canadians look at labour mobility as principally a bilateral problem between 
the United States and Mexico. This is a mistake, since the U.S. immigration debate 
complicates the entire North American agenda. As the failure of comprehensive 
immigration reform legislation in the United States in 2007 demonstrated, labour 
mobility in North America will be a significant barrier to any North American agenda. 
Yet addressing immigration/labour mobility is part of any obvious set of “next steps” 
in revitalizing that agenda. Although the NAFTA never contemplated comprehensive 
labour mobility, the NAFTA did create an entirely new category of work visa, the TN 
visa for professionals (NAFTA Chapter 16, Temporary Entry). However, the list of 
eligible professionals is limited, has proven challenging to amend, and has lacked the 
flexibility to incorporate entirely new categories of professionals, such as IT workers, Greg Anderson 
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that hardly existed in 1994. Moreover, access to TN visas has not exactly been 
equitable. While Canadians can apply for TN visas at U.S. ports of entry, Mexicans 
have had to apply through U.S. consular offices in Mexico, significantly complicating 
the process. As a result, Canadian professionals have made full use of TN visas while 
Mexico has never maximized its allotted quota. Moreover, the list of professionals 
qualifying under the TN visa has never been amended and does not reflect the 
emergence of new professions such as IT workers. 
While the Bush Administration’s efforts to win immigration reform in 2007 failed, 
they are likely to be revived by the Obama Administration in early 2010. Interestingly, 
immigration reform in 2010 will likely take a form similar to that proposed in 2007 
and involve a mix of toughened enforcement, some form of amnesty or path to 
legalization for those already in the United States, and ultimately a path to full 
naturalization.
31 According to Secretary Napolitano, the conditions on the ground have 
changed significantly since 2007, laying the foundation for much-needed reform.
32 In 
large part, the changes on the ground have involved significantly enhanced security 
along the southern border. If the Obama Administration does renew U.S. efforts to 
regularize labour flows across the southern frontier, it will be a discussion that Canada 
ought to want a piece of. Liberalization of labour flows in any part of North America 
will have spillover effects throughout the continent. Yet, for some reason, Ottawa has 
been little more than a passive observer. 
Finally, the alphabet soup of new procedures in North America has applied as 
much to the movement of people as to cargo. Entry-exit provisions of the Patriot Act 
now enshrined in the U.S.-VISIT program have had additional layers of security 
applied with implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), the 
Real ID Act for enhanced driver’s licenses, and most recently the Electronic System 
for Travel Authorization (ESTA).
33 
Immigration is not just about setting new rules for guest workers or relaxing visa 
requirements. A major source of immigration pressures between the United States and 
Mexico revolves around the disparities of wealth on either side of the U.S.–Mexican 
border. Moreover, scholars point to immigration reform as a major component of any 
poverty reduction strategy.
34 A major challenge in North America concerns the 
disparities in development that remain in Mexico, particularly in the South, that are 
placing increasing pressure on the U.S.–Mexican border in the form of illegal 
immigration as Mexicans seek to emigrate in search of a better standard of living. 
The North American Development Bank was established in 1994 as a means of 
addressing some of these issues with development projects and environmental clean-
up. The effectiveness of the NADBank has been hamstrung by a lack of full Greg Anderson 
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capitalization and the limitation that funds be directed narrowly at projects with a 
major environmental component rather than at, for instance, general infrastructure 
projects that may have positive effects on the environment. 
These efforts have been further hamstrung by Canada’s refusal to join the 
NADBank’s governance structure or contribute to its capital fund. If Canada really 
wanted to advance its North American agenda with Washington, it would invest more 
political and economic resources engaging Mexico City. The challenges of 
development for Mexico are of critical importance to North America if the continent is 
to function effectively as an engine of economic growth for everyone. Labour 
mobility and immigration issues are not just American or Mexican problems. They are 




One potential bright spot for revitalizing the North American agenda actually resides 
outside the national capitals, in the states and provinces. The North American agenda 
is packed full of pressing issues, but it is questionable whether they should be dealt 
with in a single undertaking like the NAFTA negotiations. Packaged together, 
outstanding issues in North America are impressive. If we add to the SPP agenda 
issues such as climate change, development, migration, or energy security, the North 
American agenda gets larger still. The lack of consensus on how to deal with all of it 
was underscored by the anti-trade rhetoric of the 2008 presidential campaign. 
Moreover, the debate is seldom about pieces of the North American agenda and is 
rather depressingly focused on the very merits of economic openness. There have 
been numerous efforts to outline the major issues on the North American security and 
economic agenda. There has also been no shortage of possible solutions and processes 
to get there, some of which have included the revitalization of old agendas or 
commissions of one kind or another to redefine a new agenda. There have been 
proposals for moving North America close to the EU in terms of formal 
institutionalization, and others focusing on augmenting existing processes. North 
America is emphatically not the EU. North America has a unique history and a 
complex, contemporary agenda that demands a shift away from application of cookie-
cutter rules to regions of the continent where they do not work. 
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The Decentralization of North America  
Another model for the future of North American governance is much more 
decentralized than most analysts have proposed. It would reduce the pre-eminence of 
Ottawa, Washington, and Mexico City within, but not cut them out of, discussions of 
next steps in North America. Canada, the United States, and Mexico are all federal 
systems with a range of both statutory and evolutionary patterns of exclusive and 
shared federal and subfederal powers. Federalism in Canada, in particular, has evolved 
strongly in the direction of increasing devolution of authority from Ottawa to the 
provinces. Federalism in the United States has evolved in a slightly different direction, 
but still involves significant delegation of federal responsibility to the states. Even in 
areas where federal primacy has a long history, such as national security, the 
implementation phase of many federal spending initiatives has often been left to the 
states. This has been especially true in terms of U.S. homeland security since the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security in March 2003.
35 
Shared North American governance could build upon these patterns of shared 
responsibility to engage local and regional stakeholders in the search for solutions to 
shared problems in security, the environment, development, or border facilitation. 
Indeed, proposals for further reform of DHS have strongly argued in favour of 
regionalization of the agency’s approach to many issues.
36 These proposals have 
included giving U.S. port directors significantly more responsibility for engaging 
local, state, and regional stakeholders and the authority to make substantive changes 
to meet local needs. More importantly, DHS needs to more robustly engage state-level 
homeland security officials reporting to governors, mayors, and first responders, 
possibly through a network of DHS regional offices based on a model similar to the 
Federal Reserve District system. None of North America’s borders is identical to 
another in terms of infrastructure, security risk, migratory pressures, or economic 
importance.
37 So why treat them as such from a policy perspective? The two countries 
are already working together on a range of cooperative security measures, including 
the Container Security Initiative (CSI) that places CBP inspectors in Canadian ports 
and CBSA inspectors in U.S. ports. Moreover, that same program places inspectors 
from both countries alongside each other in more than forty overseas ports.
38 
The Container Security Initiative is an obvious example of federal cooperation in 
moving the front lines of security for both Canada and the United States further away 
from the shared border. The fact that CBP/CBSA inspectors work alongside one 
another in overseas ports may represent the beginnings of a “perimeter strategy” 
advocated by many as a means of both securing and liberalizing the North American 
economic space.
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We also see a varied structure to securing borderlands in the use of Integrated 
Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) along vast stretches of open, undefended border 
between the two countries. If we view the CSI program as inching North America 
toward a broader “perimeter strategy” that is responsive to the imperatives of both 
security and economics, we can also view IBETs as responding similarly to the 
considerable variability of the Canada–U.S. land border. Even at relatively fortified 
border crossings between Canada and the United States, the physical geography, type 
of user, and critical nature of the crossing for commerce vary significantly.
40 
Resolving bottlenecks, in infrastructure for example, will necessarily entail greater 
cooperation among federal, state, and local officials for things like permitting and 
procurement. Equally, IBETs are also part of the variable response to a diverse border 
in that they use methods for border monitoring that begin at information sharing 
between law enforcement bodies and run all the way to the use of sophisticated 
technology, such as surveillance drones, to monitor sparsely populated and thinly 
guarded border regions.
41 
These kinds of activities already involve significant cooperation among federal, 
state/provincial, and local authorities. A more decentralized governance structure to 
North America would require significant deference from each national capital to 
regional initiatives in cases where federal-provincial/state jurisdiction clashed or 
overlapped. However, it would all build upon long-standing traditions in federalism in 
each country where competition between jurisdictions and between federal and 
subfederal entities has generated creative solutions to local problems that were then 
adapted elsewhere. For example, the long-running Canada–U.S. softwood lumber 
dispute might best be resolved through a regionalized mechanism of problem solving 
that minimizes the role of Ottawa and Washington. Since natural resources fall under 
provincial jurisdiction in Canada, and because the market conditions in Canada’s four 
main timber producing provinces are so different, why not allow the provinces slightly 
more autonomy in the search for a solution? 
There are numerous regional bodies and consultative mechanisms that ought to be 
given increased deference and responsibility for initiating and testing solutions to 
bilateral or trilateral problems. Provincial premiers and state governors are powerful 
voices within each country’s federal system. In many instances, agenda setting and 
initiation already take place within regular bilateral meetings of a plethora of 
groupings and organizations: 
 
Western Governors and Western Canadian Premiers 
Council of State Governments and its regional bodies Greg Anderson 
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Great Lakes Legislative Caucus 
Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers 
Border Legislative Conference (U.S.–Mexico) 
Ten States Retreat (U.S.–Mexico) 
Arizona-Mexico Commission 
Border Governors Conference 
CANAMEX Corridor Coalition 
Center for Research on North America, UNAM 
Center for North American Studies, American University 
Consortium for North American Higher Education Collaboration 
North American Forum on Integration 
Transborder Institute, University of San Diego 
North American Center for Transborder Studies, Arizona State University 
 
Also influential are non-governmental organizations such as the members of the 
Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER). PNWER has been an important 
backer of government-led initiatives such as the enhanced driver’s license programs 
piloted in Washington State and British Columbia. Their initiation was in part a 
response to the inaction by the federal government in implementing standards and 
directives for secure forms of identification acceptable for transiting borders under the 
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004) and the Real ID Act (2005). The Department of Homeland Security gave 
this program its blessing in 2007 with reluctance, but this is precisely the kind of 
initiative that North America’s federal governments should be encouraging. Not every 
subfederal initiative will be successful, nor should it be. However, increasing the input 
of local officials and regional experts on the unique problems each region confronts in 
numerous issue domains is eminently sensible. Where local initiatives seriously 
infringe upon federal prerogatives, a simple test of “reasonableness” ought to be 
applied in determining whether initiatives ought to be applied nationally or trilaterally. 
Some have called for moving in this direction on the basis of “North America, Two Greg Anderson 
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Speeds,” wherein initiatives would be implemented along both borders where 
feasible.
42 All of this would help reconcile the inherent clash in approaches to border 
management between those in Ottawa favouring “re-bilateralization” and those in 
DHS moving increasingly toward symmetrical treatment of inherently asymmetric 
borders. 
Federal deference to subfederal and non-governmental bodies will be a challenge 
in the context of each country’s respective federal dynamics. However, many of the 
issues these subfederal or non-governmental organizations could facilitate seldom rise 
to the level of high politics that require the direct attention of North America’s leaders. 
A host of issues related to infrastructure, security, immigration, or the environment 
may be technically federal in jurisdiction; however, a strong preference on the part of 
each federal government for best practices and regional solutions could be 
encouraged. 
There would inevitably be clashes over federalism depending on the issue. Yet, a 
decentralized approach to North American governance might also facilitate additional 
progress on the unruly, though still pressing, agendas set out by the SPP in 2005. The 
Washington State–British Columbia enhanced driver’s license project is only the most 
salient example of where subfederal initiatives could be responsive to broader SPP 
and North American integration objectives. 
 
Canada–U.S. Shared Border Facilities 
In many ways, the alphabet soup of security initiatives employed at North America’s 
borders pales in comparison to the problems generated by antiquated infrastructure. 
Delays at border crossings were already significant prior to the imposition of post-
9/11 security measures. The NAFTA stimulated an explosion of cross-border trade that 
was forced onto a transportation network and through ports of entry designed for the 
traffic of the 1950s.
43 
President Obama and Prime Minister Harper each pledged to direct stimulus 
package money to border infrastructure; this is also an area in which a decentralized 
approach to infrastructure and security could be highly effective.
44 To some degree we 
have seen this happen with respect to the much needed and much delayed construction 
of a new bridge at Detroit-Windsor. Yet this has not been without significant 
wrangling between levels of government in each country and private sector interests 
in control of the Ambassador Bridge.
45 
As part of the 1995 Canada–United States Accord on Our Shared Border, the 
Coutts-Sweetgrass border crossing was among three sites selected for redesign and 
construction as a wholly shared facility.
46 The initiation of these projects had a three-Greg Anderson 
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fold purpose. First, they were designed to reduce existing duplication of space and 
increase the use of areas not being used to their maximum capacity. Second, the new 
buildings would accommodate border services agencies of both countries under one 
roof or in closer proximity, thereby increasing security for the personnel and the 
traveling public. And third, the shared facilities were designed to strengthen the 
partnership and foster additional cooperation between Canada and the United States. 
These shared facilities represent one possible model for streamlining a host of issues 
confronting both countries in security, economics, and infrastructure along the 
Canada–U.S. border. Each of the shared facilities is different, reflecting the particular 
dynamics of those crossings. The same model would undoubtedly need to be adapted 
to suit busier crossings, and might be inapplicable along the U.S.–Mexican frontier. 
However, more localized input into border management would facilitate the design 
and effective operation of such facilities. 
A decentralized approach to borders is inherently limited in grand scope (much 
like the SPP itself), and will therefore be much less likely to raise the kinds of 
sovereignty concerns that typically attend large integration projects. More importantly, 
a decentralized approach to North America goes a considerable distance toward 
overcoming the limitations imposed by the “three noes.” Local control over local 
solutions to shared problems is likely to be more politically palatable in the long term 
than anything directed centrally out of national capitals and builds upon the 
foundations of limited government inherent in federal systems. Infrastructure can be 
built, information shared, and borders managed out of existing funding; such an 
approach need not generate disputes since local needs will be met; and it will not 
require scarce political capital for a large legislative initiative. Progress could be made 
on a range of pressing issues without requiring significant political capital 




North American integration has been hamstrung by the tyranny of the “three noes” for 
much of the period after 1994 and the conclusion of the NAFTA. The restrictions of 
“no money, no disputes,” and particularly “no legislation” have limited North 
American initiatives to measures implementable under existing grants of legislative 
authority and appropriation. 9/11 and the marriage of security and economics have 
resulted in considerable attention being paid to North American integration over the Greg Anderson 
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past decade. However, the Security and Prosperity Partnership is almost entirely a 
byproduct of the “three noes.”  
The outlines of the North American agenda are relatively clear, but the politics are 
complicated by both a deteriorating economy and the dominance of security. 
Unfortunately, security will continue to “trump” trade as the Department of Homeland 
Security solidifies its role as the primary agency responsible for North America. A 
new U.S. administration always brings with it the hope of renewed attention to North 
American issues. However, the full U.S. agenda and the anti-trade rhetoric of the 2008 
campaign are powerful signs that no new integration initiative to remedy the problems 
with the marriage of security and economics is in the offing for the foreseeable future. 
In many ways, the tyranny of the “three noes” seems set to endure with no significant 
shift away from the “alphabet soup” approach to increasingly symmetrical border 
management. 
More promising may be an approach to North America that advances proposals 
for border management centred on more localized initiative and control that goes 
some distance toward circumventing the “three noes.” More localized control and 
coordination can facilitate a form of border management in many areas that is as 
variable as the border itself. Such an approach builds upon the experience of 
federalism in all three countries and avoids raising the hackles of sovereignty a major 
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